

SECRET

C.O.R. 47

SOUTHERN AFRICA DEPT.

FILE PERIOD

1966 - 1968

PART

PART

FILE TITLE

FILE NUMBER

Political Refugees from
Mozambique in
Swaziland.

BBS

42/113/01

INDEX HEADINGS

Displaced Persons
Refugees.

Mozambique / Swaziland.

17342.

PRECEDENTS NOTED UNDER:—

RELATED FILES:—

BBS 72/113/01 1963/65 Serial previous.

1SD 160/319/01 (T.S.).

BBS/A157.

BBS 72/433/01

REFERENCED UNDER:—

POLICE + CONSTABULARY.

NOMINALS:—

Mondlane. E.
" M.

FRELIMO
PIDE

Da Costa.

Mangusso
Brown.

1 Camps FO. and Lisbon letters 1822/65 of 31 Dec - 10/1/65
+ Lourenço Marques COM 10/9/8 Dec

Mrs. Osborne to see the 2 letters enclosed
with (1) pl. I attach a draft
letter to Mr. Long for conson pl.

Ab. Howard
11/1

Mr. Hall

The correspondence on these papers concerns Mozambique refugees in Swaziland and the consequential undesirable activities on the part of members and agents of P.I.D.E., the Portuguese Secret Police.

2. During the course of 1965 there were four cases of the suspected kidnapping of refugees in Swaziland in which we had reason to believe that P.I.D.E. were involved. In none of the cases had we ~~had~~ any proof of the complicity of the Portuguese Police which would enable us to make a direct protest to the Portuguese Government. When the first two cases arose it was, however, felt that the circumstances of the disappearance of the two men were such that our Ambassador in Lisbon could be instructed to tell the Portuguese orally that we were mystified as to their whereabouts and would be grateful for their comments on reports that the men were under detention in Lourenço Marques. This was done in July last, ~~and~~ At the same time the Portuguese were told that enquiries pointed to the involvement of two P.I.D.E. men and that we were not satisfied that the visit of these two P.I.D.E. members to Swaziland at the relevant time was for a holiday.

3. The Portuguese Foreign Minister undertook to investigate the matter and let us know the outcome. We have, however, had nothing further from him and for various reasons the Foreign Office have not thought it opportune to press for a substantive reply. In our letter to the Foreign Office at (90) we suggested possible alternative ways of curbing the activities of P.I.D.E. in Swaziland and you will see from the correspondence at (1) on this file that opinion in Lourenço Marques and Lisbon, with which the Foreign Office agree, is that it would now be preferable to more or less abandon the Lisbon approach for the time being, and take the matter up in a general way with the Portuguese Consul in Mbabane. (You will incidentally see from the correspondence at (88A), (104) and (109) that the ~~is~~ ^{is} something of an enigma at present). In the light of all this it is now proposed that we should write to Mr. Long in Swaziland, as in the draft opposite. You may, however,

feel that Mrs. White should see ~~the papers~~
before the letter goes off as she has asked to
be kept in touch with developments on these
papers.

K.O.H. Osborne

(K.O.H. Osborne)
18th January, 1966.

The action now proposed is that recommended in para 3 (a)
of the brief for Mrs White ab (98) on 63-65 file. There is nothing
to report at this stage until we receive a reply to the letter to Mr Long
opposite.

as in aft.

UHH
19/1
atms

19 Jan.

9/2 2

A.C.E. Long. Lesq. C. BE

3 Foreign Office. - ISA 1822/46 (US)

19 Jan

PK

Mr Osborne.

There is no reply to (2).

liking. 9/2

Another 3 weeks,

K.O.H. Osborne

9.2.66.

2/5.

PK

H Swaziland - C 1219/1/28
Comig Gen III/503/01)

20 Jan

5 Inbabane — 51130C/30 — 14 Feb.

~~Mr. Kott.~~

6 Foreign Office and Justice Marques — 8 Mar
letter to FO. CON 10/9
of 15 Feb.

5 and 6

We obviously cannot carry this
any further at present and can only hope
that the best view that we shall probably
have no more trouble is borne out by events;
provided the refugee flow continues to be ~~low~~ small
and to consist of individuals of low calibre
the chances are that this will be so.

Mr. White will wish to see. Please b.m.
after the election for this

W. Osborne

11-3.66.

7 Zomba — Pol C/37 — 9 Mar
Orig GEN 111/508/01.

Mrs. Osborne to see (7) pl ref (4).

Then put by.
Robertson
31/3

Sam, thank you. a copy of

7 should go to Mr. Fairlie ref 4. (unless this
has been done on GEN 111/508/01)

sent off Gen Papers
Birkhead
114

31.3.66

8

Swayland Saw 94 end copy No 11
of F.R.E.L.I.N.O in Swayland

4/4

B.V. in Osborne minute of 11/3?

Burpelle
14/4

Mrs. Campbell A. 19/4.

1. Ref Mrs. Osborne's minute of the 11th March, the pps did not come forward in time for Mrs. White to see before her departure from the Office. In view, however, of the contents of (5) + (6) the earlier copies may perhaps be regarded as closed. ? Put by.

2. You may care to see E8 which has been sent for info.

Mrs. Hall ^{new 26/4} may also wish to see and Mrs. Hanmer ^{26/4} + Mrs. Osborne (on return). Mrs. Donohoe ^{Bd 24/4} sh'd also see.

Ab. Howard

18/4

M. Hanmer. See thanks. 26/4

Please see above minute.

E. King 26/4.

9

Est: Briefing Note for U.K. Delegation to the
UN Committee of 24 (ref BBS 125/376/03) — 4 May

Mr Osborne. ~~Not done~~ 6.5.66.

Please see (E/8)

6/5/5

CLOSED

NO FURTHER
ACTION

TO BE TAKEN
IN THIS FILE

CONTINUED ON:-

SAD 18/22

1967

Mozambique refugees in Swaziland.

(ii) The cases of Ibrahim Mangusso and Freddy Brown, who disappeared from Swaziland, remain unresolved. It was not possible for the Swaziland Police to establish whether they had been abducted, but, in view of reports that the two men were in prison in Lourenco Marques, it was felt that the circumstances of their disappearance justified an approach to the Portuguese authorities. Our Ambassador in Lisbon accordingly told the Portuguese Foreign Minister in July 1965 that we were mystified as to the two men's whereabouts, and that we would be glad to receive the Portuguese Government's comments on the case. The Portuguese Foreign Minister undertook to investigate the matter and let our Ambassador know the result. Meanwhile a further case arose with the disappearance of Mario Modlane, who was last seen leaving Msundusa, in Mbabane, alone in his car on the evening of Friday, 27th August 1965, after distributing Welfare Committee funds to refugees there. He was reported missing by his wife on the 30th August, and his car was subsequently found abandoned by the Police on 31st August near Lobamba, some ten miles from Mbabane. It was not possible to obtain any definite information as to his whereabouts.

We did not hear anything further from Lisbon following the approach to the Portuguese Foreign Minister and in view of other subsequent developments it was felt inopportune to press for a reply. In these circumstances it was decided that the general question of disappearances of Mozambique refugees from Swaziland should be raised locally with the Portuguese Consul in Mbabane. This was done in February when the Consul

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denied having anything to do with the disappearance of Mondlane, but declared, off the record, that P.I.D.F. was responsible for the disappearance of Mangusso and Brown and said that he had received assurances from Lisbon that such action would not be taken again.

The disappearance of Mangusso and Brown was raised in the Committee of 24 at its meeting in Dar es Salaam in June 1965, by Eduardo Mondlane the Frelimo Leader. Mondlane was subsequently informed in August via the U.N Secretariat that investigations into the alleged kidnappings had produced no firm proof that the Portuguese Government were involved in the disappearance of the two men and the earlier denial of collusion between the Swaziland Police and P.I.D.F was reiterated. It was not revealed that an approach to the Portuguese had been made (although certain M.P's interested in the case were told this in confidence) but it was said that if we were to obtain fresh evidence which satisfied us that the Portuguese were responsible, strong representations would be made in Lisbon. If the question is raised again we can only stick to this line.

Encl: Briefing note for U.K. delegation to Committee of 24
(Orig BBS 125/376/03)

9

10 May

SAVINGRAM

FROM: HER MAJESTY'S COMMISSIONER, SWAZILAND.

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES, (Initd.) 7/BKW.
LONDON.

Ref. No. S.1086/7/43.

Date 4.4.1966.
Swazichron A312

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No.94/1966.

FRELIMO

✓ Copy No.11 of "F.R.E.L.I.M.O.in Swaziland"
is enclosed for your information.

CHIEF
RECORDS OFFICE
14 APR 1966
COLONIAL OFFICE

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RECEIVED
14 APR 1966

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CENTRIC

COPY NO.11.....

128

FRENTE DE LIBERTACAO DE MOZAMBIQUE
(F.R.E.L.I.M.O.)

F.R.E.L.I.M.O. IN SWAZILAND

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FRENTE DE LIBERTACAO DE MOZAMBIQUE (F.R.E.L.I.M.O.)

F.R.E.L.I.M.O. IN SWAZILAND

-----oOo-----

OBJECT

1. The purpose of this paper is:
 - (a) To consolidate and bring up to date all information available on the presence and organisation of FRELIMO in Swaziland.
 - (b) To consider the repercussions of the arrest and deportation to Mozambique by the S.A.P. of some 75 FRELIMO refugees who were attempting to cross the Transvaal from Swaziland to Bechuanaland, and the suspected abduction from Swaziland of IBRAHIM MANGUSSO and FREDDY BROWN, and others by members of P.I.D.E.
 - (c) To assess in the light of the most recent information available, what threat, if any, is posed to our security by the continuing presence of FRELIMO refugees in Swaziland.

INTRODUCTION

2. FRELIMO activities in Swaziland were really confined to the period between 1964 and June, 1965. This paper is, therefore, almost exclusively concerned with events over that period.
3. FRELIMO is essentially an external organisation based in Tanzania, with objectives in Mozambique. As the establishment of a FRELIMO organisation in Swaziland was effected in accordance with its policy and as a result of its activities in Southern Mozambique, a separate paper is attached as Appendix "C" which provides a background to the events in Swaziland.

EARLY HISTORY

4. One surprising aspect of the Mozambique nationalist parties' planning is their neglect of Swaziland as a centre of operations for so long. Uniao de etc. (UDENAMO) overlooked Swaziland and FRELIMO did not consider it of any great importance until their plan of operations was extended to include South Mozambique.

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5. In January/.....

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5. In January, 1963, IBRAHIM ABDULLAH MANGUSSO and ABDUL CARIM VAZIRNA fled to Swaziland after a P.I.D.E. purge in Lourenco Marques. MANGUSSO, an Afro-Asian (Arab) upholsterer, had been imprisoned as a member of a UDENAMO group consisting of intellectuals mostly Coloured, in Lourenco Marques. Shortly after arrival, MANGUSSO found employment with the VIERAS, proprietors of Mbabane Panel Beaters, replacing ISALAH LEITAO NYAKA (NHACA) who was retiring. Although MANGUSSO and NYAKA were both members of UDENAMO they had not met before. NYAKA, who came to Swaziland in 1957, was really no more than a UDENAMO sympathiser. He had never been politically active.

6. Also in Swaziland at the time of MANGUSSO's arrival were MARIO MONDLANE, vegetable seller at the Mbabane Market, and VICTORINO MONDLANE, a decorator.

7. Early in 1964, MANGUSSO and the two MONDLANES organised a football club in Mbabane, hoping by this means to raise money to support Mozambican refugees and provide a cover for FRELIMO activities. This was done with the approval of the Central Committee in Dar-Es-Salaam. At the time, refugees in Swaziland numbered no more than fifteen, mostly members of UDENAMO who hoped to make their way eventually to Lusaka. This was the nucleus around which the 'Provisional Headquarters Circle of FRELIMO in Swaziland' came into being in July, 1964.

POLICY

8. MANGUSSO visited Dar-Es-Salaam in December, 1963. He returned to Swaziland shortly afterwards, with instructions from the FRELIMO Central Committee to establish a camp in Swaziland designed for the military and political training of FRELIMO recruits.

9. The Central Committee had promised supplies of arms and ammunition from Dar-Es-Salaam to equip the recruits. MANGUSSO was himself responsible for training the men in guerilla warfare, after which they were to be sent in groups to carry out acts of terrorism and sabotage in the areas of Lourenco Marques and Joao Belo. It was intended that these troops should remain in Mozambique hiding in the bush, only returning to Swaziland if they got into difficulties.

10. Although no information exists which might give an indication of the numbers to be trained in Swaziland, in October, 1964, the Mbabane Committee were told to make preparations for the reception of 'thousands' of Freedom Fighters from March, 1965 onwards.

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11. During the/.....

11. During the early days, the Mbabane Committee's most pressing problem appears to have been refugee welfare, and this was the ostensible reason for a decision to organise circles among Mozambican employees in Swaziland. A weekly meeting of the Committee took place from 5th August, 1964, onwards, during which discussions, marked by dissension and petty grievances, centred on refugee welfare, the safe custody of funds and preparation of accounts, and whether or not to allow Swazi women to join the League Femina. It was only in the final stages of its existence that the Committee considered and discussed security and the practicability of carrying out military training in Swaziland. These were originally the responsibility of MANGUSSO and later of the Operational Command.

ORGANISATION

12. In July, 1964, MATIAS MBOA arrived in Swaziland from Lourenco Marques with the object of establishing an Operation Command, a transit centre for freedom fighters and to reconnoitre the border areas. MBOA was the FRELIMO commander of operations for the FRELIMO IVth Region, or the 'Sud du Save' region of Mozambique.

13. Upon arrival, MBOA contacted the local FRELIMO Committee. He appointed a Chairman, and nominated other members to what was now called the Provisional Headquarters Circle Committee (see Appendix "A") and by the 27th July, was able to report to Dar-Es-Salaam that he was acting as the Swaziland representative. The Operational Command, under MBOA's leadership, was composed of MANGUSSO @ FREDDY BROWN and LEONARDO CUMBE. There were other members, but these were never positively identified. Whilst under MBOA's leadership the Operational Command functioned independently and did not take the mother body into its confidence.

14. LEONARDO CUMBE was appointed organiser for Mhlungeni, Manzini, Sidvokodvo and Mhlume. MANGUSSO was directed to look after the Shangaan employees at Havelock Asbestos Mine, but visited Havelock once only. The Havelock Shangaans were unsympathetic, so much so that he never went back.

15. By August, 1964, a Committee consisting of FRANCISCO NJOBENI, Chairman, and ABDULLAH BINO, Secretary, was appointed at Manzini, where thirty five people were listed as FRELIMO members, but there is no evidence that they ever supported their Committee.

16. Mbabane had 68 members listed in August, 1964. They appear to have been neglected after October, and very few of them ever came to security notice.

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17. In the Ngwenya Mine area only ten individuals were listed as members, two of them described as 'militants'. Several of the names re-occur in the Mbabane list, and were probably contractors' employees, all of whom have long since left the area.

18. LEONARDO CUMBE attempted recruitment, apparently not very successfully, amongst railway contractors' employees at Sidvokodvo in December, 1964. Membership figures are not available.

19. Records of the Mhlume, Big Bend and Tshaneni areas give a total of nineteen members, including a 'military consul' and another 'militant'. These and the Ngwenya Mine militants are the only reference to specialist groups or individuals in Swaziland, although the houses of certain members in the Big Bend and Mhlume areas are used as staging posts for FRELIMO recruits from Mozambique.

FINANCE.

20. The FRELIMO Committee in Mbabane fully realised the magnitude of the financial demands which would arise with the arrival of large numbers of freedom fighters from Mozambique, and in December, 1964, stated their problem at a meeting of the Swaziland Refugee Welfare Committee. The FRELIMO Committee had already decided that every Shangaan employee in Swaziland would have to contribute 50c. monthly in order to meet anticipated costs.

21. FRELIMO records show that only 20 members contributed towards funds between August and December, 1964. Individual amounts never exceeded 50c. and the total accounted for was less than R16.00. No records are available for 1965, and by the end of 1964, the monthly total received had dropped from R5.50 to R1.50 all of it contributed by the Committee members themselves.

22. Accusations against MARIO MONDLANE, the Treasurer, for his failure to collect subscriptions or to maintain proper records were justly made, and he was relieved of his position. Even so, it was quite obvious that the few FRELIMO members among the Shangaan labour forces in Swaziland were unwilling contributors.

23. In November, 1964, the Central Committee in Dar-Es-Salaam sent sums of R200 and R800, the last remittance in reply to MATIAS MBOA's request for money to open a business 'to hide their dangerous activities'. MBOA only declared R800 to the Committee, of which R120 was used to take over stock at Brown DLADLA's Grocery Store in Msunduzi township, and R24.00 monthly rent paid until the business was relinquished in June, 1965.

24. The grocery/5.....

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24. The grocery business, managed by the FRELIMO Chairman, NYAKA, purchased additional stock worth R200 in December. Assuming that they made the customary profit margin of 25%, for that month the profit should have been R80. In subsequent months, profits declined until in April, only R40 was spent on stock, which by then consisted of essentials such as bread and margarine. Bad debts and free issues to FRELIMO members brought the business to this state, as cash was not available for subsequent stock purchases and wholesalers refused credit.

25. From January, 1965, onwards, the Committee in Dar-Es-Salaam sent R80.00 each month to MANGUSSO. The total received by the FRELIMO Committee from all sources is estimated to have been nearly R1,700 between the period November, 1964 - June, 1965, of which the greater part was used to rent accommodation which at one time consisted of no less than 14 houses or rooms in Msunduza alone. There is no record of what happened to the R200 kept by MATIAS MBOA.

26. In September, 1964, FRELIMO opened an account in the name of F. NGOBENI at Barclays Bank (D.C. & O) Manzini with a deposit of R7.00. The balance never exceeded R11.00. Although the Committee did agree to deposit all their funds at Manzini, they never did so, nor did they continue with a later proposal to open a second account at Mbabane in the name of 'The Helping Hands Society'. Almost the entire R800 received in November, had disappeared by February, 1965. It has been claimed that the Swaziland Refugee Welfare Committee each month gave R10.00 to every recruit registered as a refugee, but not all recruits were registered. This money was kept by each individual and there is no reason to suspect that any found its way into FRELIMO funds. From the number and frequency of complaints of hunger, particularly by the inmates of the camp at Ezulweni, it appears that the money available from all sources was woefully inadequate.

27. SIDONIA BILA, one of the first of the fugitives from Lourenco Marques, arrived in December, 1964, with nearly R1,300. This amount was earmarked for travelling expenses for the group on its journey northwards, and was presumably seized when the group were arrested in the Republic.

COMMUNICATIONS

28. Security is the governing consideration in all FRELIMO activities, and both the Mbabane Committee and the Central Committee employed the use of code names or cypher in even the most innocuous

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of their/6.....

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of their messages. The traffic from Mbabane, sent either by post or telegraph, consisted mainly of demands for money, the movement of couriers or Front officials, and the despatch of recruits Northwards. More important communications, such as operational reports, were carried by couriers. The Mbabane Committee continually complained over the long delays before the Central Committee replied to their requests, and there is little doubt that they were largely neglected and totally unaware of FRELIMO activities and progress in Mozambique and the North.

29. A limited number of propaganda pamphlets were sent in reply to requests in late 1964, but consisted of copies of FRELIMO 'Statutes and Programme' printed some 2 years earlier, and minutes of the inaugural meeting of FRELIMO in 1962.

30. MATIAS MBOA, using the cover name of KHUMALO, was responsible for all communications with the Central Committee until his departure when IBRAHIM MANGUSSO took over. The following addresses were used by FRELIMO in Mbabane:

Box 326 - IBRAHIM MANGUSSO - rented by N.N.L.C.

Box 96 - ISALIAH NYAKA - Msunduzi Township public box

Box 193 - IBRAHIM MANGUSSO - rented by FERNANDO SOARES

Box 15 - MATIAS MBOA - rented by Central Hotel.

Box 280 - MARIO MONDLANE - rented by S.T.MAREMBELA

P. O. Box 20, Kwaluseni, rented by Dr. A. P. ZWANE was also used.

31. GEORGE MATHEBULA, a shoe shine boy occupying a pitch outside the public telephone kiosk at the Central Hotel in Mbabane, accepted calls for FRELIMO at the kiosk. Telephones, Mbabane 791 in SOARES tailor's shop, and Manzini 491 rented by EDUARDO MONDLANE, manager of a shop in Manzini, were regularly used by FRELIMO. MATHEBULA acted as runner for MBOA and later for MANGUSSO.

32. In 1964, MATIAS MBOA organised a very efficient courier system between Lourenco Marques and Mbabane which, by mid-1965, was employing ten known couriers, nearly all of them refugees, who also acted as guides conducting parties of new recruits to Mbabane. Their route passed through Nomahasha where Front members provided safe houses for the transients who usually waited until nightfall before climbing the border fence just North of the town.

33. In Swaziland, the houses of San tome MASHABA, owner of a transport business near Nomahasha and Sarmento KHOZA, a carpenter at Tshaneni, were those most frequently used to house couriers or recruits in transit. Four other houses have been identified in Portuguese Nomahasha.

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34. The escape/7.....

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34. The escape route to Mbabane was controlled by FRELIMO in Lourenco Marques until the beginning of 1965 when the Front there was broken up by P.I.D.E. and the Mbabane Operational Committee took over. One of the organisers in Lourenco Marques was the Rev. S. G. MASSANGO of the African Episcopal Mission at Chambankulu Location who often visited Swaziland and the R.S.A., ostensibly upon the affairs of his church. One of his friends, the Rev. M. L. V. MAGESELA of Witbank, fled to Swaziland in August, 1964 on his advice but MAGESELA's wife still lives in Witbank. MARIO MONDLANE lived in Pretoria from 1958 onwards and has friends living in Mine compounds at Witbank, Oogies and also at Germiston. It is believed that each of these people have persuaded fellow Mozambicans to provide shelter for transients through the Republic, but details and identities are not known. VICENTE MURIAMBO, representative of the Central Committee, visited the Republic on a number of occasions and was able to remain there with apparent immunity for short periods. He is also a pastor of the Mozambican A.E.M.

35. Two other Central Committee representatives were sent to the R.S.A. in July, 1964 with the intention of improving staging arrangements, but only one, DANIEL MAHLELA, arrived. Nothing is known of his background or activities.

36. It appears that only couriers or officials make use of staging posts. Recruits travel in hired transport as quickly as possible and, if forced to stop over in the R.S.A., rely upon their driver, rarely a member of FRELIMO, to find them a safe house.

INTERNAL AFFILIATIONS

37. In March, 1964, the FRELIMO Central Committee in Dar-Es-Salaam asked DUMISA DLAMINI, Secretary General of the Ngwane National Liberation Congress (N.N.L.C.) to assist MARIO MONDLANE to go to Dar-Es-Salaam and to establish contact with MANGUSSO and two members of UDENAMO living in Swaziland. DUMISA declined to do so and, so far as is known, the policy of the N.N.L.C. is to support UDENAMO an association that dates back to 1961 when DUMISA, as Dr. ZWANE's representative at a UDENAMO conference in Dar-Es-Salaam, discussed the use of Swaziland as a refugee centre. Nevertheless, N.N.L.C. have been sympathetic towards FRELIMO members in Swaziland and have encouraged their members to assist Mozambican refugees, have allowed the use of their offices as a classroom and a number of N.N.L.C. officials have given tuition in English and Swazi. Groups of FRELIMO members attend public N.N.L.C. meetings in Mbabane but take

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no part/8.....

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no part in the proceedings. It is true, nevertheless, that much of the co-operation extended by the N.N.L.C. was due entirely to MACDONALD MASEKO's interest in FRELIMO which continued until his suspension as N.N.L.C. Vice President in 1965.

38. The Swaziland Progressive Party (S.P.P. under J. J. NQUKU, are also sympathetic to FRELIMO and have allowed them to use their Hall in Msunduza.

39. In February, 1965, SIMON NXUMALO, emissary of King Sobhuza of Swaziland, met Dr. EDUARDO MONDLANE, President of FRELIMO, whilst touring independent African States in a bid to secure support for the Imbokodo, the ruling traditional party in Swaziland. NXUMALO convinced Dr. MONDLANE of the desirability of establishing good relations with the ruling party in Swaziland, and persuaded him to oppose the attendance of N.N.L.C. officials at meetings of the African Liberation Committee (A.L.C.) scheduled to be held in Zanzibar shortly afterwards. This MONDLANE apparently did; at least the N.N.L.C. representatives did not attend, and Dr. MONDLANE followed this up by writing to the King and to the Imbokodo expressing sympathy and support for the King in his struggle for independence, and thanking him for the assistance rendered to FRELIMO in Swaziland. So far as is known, no material assistance has been given.

40. It is of interest to note that in April, 1965, the Mozambique Revolutionary Committee (COREMO) a new front movement composed of other Mozambique nationalist parties, rival to FRELIMO, wrote to the 'Prime Minister' of Swaziland asking for financial aid and other assistance. COREMO had failed in their attempt to persuade FRELIMO to merge with them.

COMMUNISM

41. There is no evidence of communist influence within FRELIMO circles in Swaziland, nor that any of the officials visiting from Dar-Es-Salaam had been to Iron Curtain countries.

42. In the early part of 1964, MARIO MONDLANE, and later MATIAS MBOA, were friendly with SYDNEY KITCHING, a European farmer of communist views, but the object on both sides was at that time principally one of expediency. KITCHING sought African support for his trade union activities wherever possible. He did take a few self-styled UDENAMO members to Zambia in 1964, and previously had taken codes and reports for MATIAS MBOA. MONDLANE was looking for financial aid for refugees, and had agreed to provide refugees to

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work/9.....

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work on KITCHING's farm in return for food and accommodation. Nothing came of this proposal, nevertheless KITCHING maintains contact with FRELIMO leaders in Dar-Es-Salaam, apparently still in the hope of being able to make some use of the FRELIMO refugees in Swaziland. KITCHING, who left Swaziland in September, 1964, and was later declared a Prohibited Immigrant, is in close contact with E.W. (BILLY) MORGAN, a friend and former business associate living in Swaziland. MORGAN makes frequent overtures to the FRELIMO refugees in the hope of regaining their confidence and trust, but whilst this may be ostensibly on KITCHING's behalf, there is little doubt that his immediate task is to collect information for the South African Police.

PENETRATION

43. So far during their stay in Swaziland, FRELIMO members have made no attempt to seek employment with Government, or to penetrate any Government Department, other organisations or institutions. They discourage all contact or associations by members outside their own circle, and generally disapprove of their members accepting any form of employment.

ACTIVITIES IN SWAZILAND

44. As reported, the Mbabane FRELIMO Headquarters Committee had achieved very little during the term of its existence and the FRELIMO grocery business functioned only because of the efforts of MBOA. Through him the Operational Command also rented a house at Ezulweni intended as the military training camp, another at Msunduza for use as his office and a third to house the ten members already in Msunduza, although they moved into the camp almost immediately.

45. MBOA's departure for Lourenco Marques on 16th December, 1964, was made at the order of the FRELIMO Regional Commander in South Mozambique. MBOA received a countermanding order at Nomahasha but disregarded it and continued to Lourenco Marques by car where he was betrayed and arrested on 21st December, 1964. Within 12 hours he led P.I.D.E. to the Regional Commander, who, together with other important leaders, was arrested. It was this disaster that prompted many of the FRELIMO members in Lourenco Marques to flee to Swaziland.

46. With the arrival of the first of the refugees in Swaziland at the end of December, 1964, the dissension within the Mbabane Headquarters Committee, and the undertones of distrust already discernible between the mother body and the Operational Command, were

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brought out into the open by the allegations of MATEUS MUTHEMBA, leader of the newcomers. His most serious accusation was that the Mbabane Operational Command, composed largely of Coloured members, had engineered the betrayal of MATIAS MBOA, and that another FRELIMO group in Lourenco Marques, with a membership predominantly Coloured, had deliberately taken no steps to warn the Regional Commander and other leaders in Lourenco Marques, thus ensuring their arrest.

47. MUTHEMBA expressed disgust with the Mbabane Committee for their inability to provide his people with accommodation, and accused them of squandering Front funds on themselves. He refused to obey the instruction of the Operational Command that he and his men should enter the military training camp at Fzulweni, pointing out that it would be dangerous to proceed with the original intention as a full report of MBOA's activities and the purpose of the camp were exposed in a Portuguese newspaper article of 27th December, 1964.

48. MUTHEMBA and his followers preferred to remain in Msunduza instead until arrangements could be made for them to go to Dar-Es Salaam. The reaction of the Mbabane Committee was to refuse to assist or support members of this group.

49. On 13th February, 1965, MATHEUS MUTHEMBA, having received no reply to his appeals to the Central Committee, left Swaziland for Dar-Es-Salaam. He took with him detailed plans for a campaign of terrorism and sabotage in Southern Mozambique prepared by his own Operational Command.

50. The Mbabane Committee immediately sent LEONARDO CUMBE, commander of the military camp, to Dar-Es-Salaam, hoping thereby to forestall any attempt by MUTHEMBA to discredit them.

51. Although without their commander, the military camp continued to run on military lines with standing orders governing reception and interrogation of new arrivals, control of visitors, censorship of mail and rosters for fatigues and guards, there is no evidence to suggest that instruction on military subjects was ever given.

52. Discontent was rife among the inmates of the military camp and deputations were sent to complain to the Mbabane Committee over conditions and shortage of food. When a meeting finally took place on 15th February, the recruits attempted to assault the Chairman, and later that night, made a determined attempt to set fire to the FRELIMO business premises. No complaints were made to the Police.

53. At Msunduza, MUTHEMBA's refugees conducted classes among themselves in such subjects as political party organisation, African

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nationalism, and the English, Portuguese, and Zulu languages. Tuition was given by their own leaders occasionally assisted by N.N.L.C. members. Again, there is no evidence that military training was given in any form. Emissaries frequently visited Lourenco Marques encouraging other members to come to Swaziland with the promise that they would be sent onwards to Dar-Es-Salaam for military training or further education.

54. By the 22nd February, 1965, there were 20 recruits at the military camp in Ezulweni. 60 were scattered among houses in Msunduza and a further 10 were living in Manzini. It was on this date that the Swaziland Police searched ten of the houses occupied by FRELIMO members in Msunduza, the military camp at Ezulweni and other houses in Manzini, in an attempt to gain evidence of offences under the 'Violence Abroad' Proclamation (Proc. No. 27/63). Documentary evidence recovered confirmed suspicions that such offences had been committed, but was insufficient for a prosecution. 98 rounds of Algerian 9mm ammunition were recovered from a hiding place in MANGUSSO's fowl run, but very few copies of their correspondence with the Central Committee were discovered. It is believed that these, together with the codes and a further quantity of ammunition were kept by FREDDY BROWN.

55. In March, VICENTE MURIAMBO, a Central Committee representative sent to Swaziland to assist FRELIMO members to go to Dar-Es-Salaam, was arrested at Havelock. Since he claimed to be a P.I.D.E. agent and the FRELIMO leaders in Mbabane denied knowing him, he was allowed to go to P.E.A. at his own request. Although seen to cross the border safely, he shortly afterwards wrote to MACDONALD MASEKO from South African alleging that he had been handed over to P.I.D.E. but had managed to escape.

56. MURIAMBO's story, together with the search operation by the Swaziland Police, confirmed the fears of FRELIMO leaders that the Swaziland authorities were adopting a firmer line with FRELIMO and their attempts to find a means of reaching Dar-Es-Salaam were intensified.

ESCAPES AND DISAPPEARANCES

57. By the early part of May, 1965, when the number of declared FRELIMO members in Mbabane and Ezulweni had reached 110, the remaining leaders of MUTHEMBA's group had completed negotiations for the transportation of their followers to Bechuanaland on the

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first stage of their journey to Tanzania. According to FRELIMO records, the negotiations were carried out with 'Mr. 3, 8, 1, 13, 7' of Manzini. He has never been identified.

58. On the 9th May, 1965, nearly a hundred of the refugees disappeared overnight from Msunduza. Nineteen of them, now under the leadership of MURIAMBO, arrived safely in Bechuanaland. Nothing was heard of the others until announcements in South African newspapers revealed that approximately 75 had been arrested at Middelburg on 9th May, when they were found hidden in a pantechicon. Information from other sources indicates that the S.A.P. sent them back to P.E.A. in sealed railway trucks, and, after being kept in a prison for political offenders at Mabalane in the Gaza District, they were removed to Chamanquane Gaol in the Lourenco Marques area, where they are now.

59. On the 18th May, IBRAHIM MANGUSSO was kidnapped from near Mbabane Panel Beaters in broad daylight. Police investigations point to the probability that this was carried out by P.I.D.E. operatives, but positive proof was never obtained.

60. On the night of 18th May, 1965, FREDDY BROWN failed to return from a visit to Manzini with J. de J. DIAS, a Portuguese taxi owner. DIAS alleged BROWN went off with friends in Manzini. BROWN and MANGUSSO are reported to have since been seen by FRELIMO members in Lourenco Marques on their way to interrogation at P.I.D.E. Headquarters.

61. MARIO MONDLANE disappeared from Mbabane on the night of 27th August, 1965. His car was later found abandoned at Lobamba Hot Springs with an automatic pistol, a broken piece of butt plate from another pistol and a human finger tip lying nearby. It is suspected that he was enticed to Lobamba by two prostitutes at the instigation of P.I.D.E. operatives who were waiting for him there.

62. FERNANDO SOARES, counsellor of the FRELIMO committee, in Mbabane, is reported to be in prison in Mozambique, having been arrested by S.A.P. during a visit to South Africa in March, 1965.

63. JEREMIAH MAHLAZA was never active in the FRELIMO committee, VICTORINO MONDLANE and FRANCISCO MUNGUAMBE had both withdrawn from the Committee before June, 1965, when the Chairman ISALAH NYAKA was admitted to hospital critically ill, and where he is today. At the time of his disappearance, MONDLANE was the sole active survivor of the Mbabane Provisional Headquarters, FRELIMO committee. All known members of the Operational Committee are reported to be in

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prison in Lourenco Marques. CONSTANTIN ANDREW DLAMINI, suspected to be a member of the Operational Committee, left Swaziland in August, 1965.

TRANSPORT

64. The following people are known to have provided vehicles for use by FRELIMO refugees attempting to make their way to Dêr-Es-Salaam since the beginning of 1965.

BILLY MORGAN	Ford Zephyr SD5086
MACDONALD MASEKO	N.N.L.C. landrover SD 11385
ELIAS MAMBA	Taxis - blue Thames traders SD 11701 and SD 11478
HERMON MKHWANAZI	Vulani Bus - cream SD 8160
KENNETH DUBE	Plymouth taxi - SD 11531
VALI CASSIM ADANI @	White V.W. MLA 13 - 10
VALI MOHAMMED	

65. The first three are the only ones known to have been used in conveying the large party of FRELIMO members from Swaziland on the night of 9th May, 1965.

66. Vehicles belonging to HERMON MKHWANAZI and BILLY MORGAN are reported to have successfully conveyed FRELIMO members to Bechuanaland. There are good grounds for believing that both are S.A.P. informers.

67. Upon one occasion, DUBE was arrested by the S.A.P. together with several FRELIMO members found in his car. He was almost immediately released. One of the FRELIMO members who escaped arrest on that occasion later wrote to friends in Mbabane alleging they were betrayed. Nothing was ever heard of the other members of that group.

68. FRELIMO members in Swaziland used public transport whenever possible owing to shortage of funds. Leaders used taxis upon occasion but did not confine themselves to any particular one, except that VALI MOHAMMED was invariably employed on journeys to Lourenco Marques.

CONCLUSIONS

69. It was undoubtedly the intention of FRELIMO to use Swaziland as a training centre and forward base for military and terrorist operations in South Mozambique. With the breakup of the FRELIMO

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organisation in Lourenco Marques at the end of 1964, it became obvious that this intention would have to be abandoned, but the information available suggests that the Mbabane Committee hoped that the Territory could still be used as a transit centre for recruits on their way to Dar-Es-Salaam.

70. The arrest of the group of 75 by the S.A.P. brought home the fact that the difficulties of conveying large numbers of recruits across the Republic were almost insurmountable. With the abduction of the three main FRELIMO protagonists came the realisation that political asylum in Swaziland whatever the attitude of the Government or amount of sympathy implied by the ruling party, did not confer immunity. In each of the abductions, it is suspected that P.I.D.E. officials took an active part, although assisted in each case by resident operatives and informers, mostly Portuguese nationals resident in Swaziland. It was this factor more than any other which handicapped Police investigation into the abductions. The success of the arrests by the S.A.P. confirm indications that information is exchanged and the closest co-operation maintained between the South African and Portuguese authorities.

71. One of the most noticeable of the results has been the decline in the number of fugitives arriving in Swaziland from Mozambique. Since June, 1965, no more than 45 have reported. At the same time, Swaziland is still the most accessible sanctuary in an emergency.

72. At present there are 45 declared FRELIMO refugees in Swaziland and a handful of sympathisers scattered throughout main centres and labour forces of Swaziland. The refugees are of low calibre and lukewarm enthusiasm whose main purpose in coming to Swaziland is hope of employment. There is no effective leadership and activity is limited to the everyday problems of existence.

73. A number of reports received over the past two years containing allegations of large scale caching of arms, ammunition and explosives by FRELIMO in Swaziland are believed to have originated from the South African or Mozambican Police authorities. Other than a further quantity of 9mm parabellum ammunition reported to have been seen in FREDDY BROWN's possession, there is no supporting information available from Swaziland sources or FRELIMO records.

74. FRELIMO do not present any threat at present, but the amount of time and effort needed to maintain supervision of these refugees makes considerable demands upon Police and Special Branch, demands which increase with the influx of new refugees.

75. Despite the known difficulties of penetrating an alien and security conscious organisation, it is believed that any move to resume their political activities should be immediately discernible.

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APPENDIX "A"

COMPOSITION OF THE MBABANE COMMITTEE AND OPERATIONAL COMMAND

Mbabane Committee

ISAIAH NYAKA @ NHACA	President
IBRAHIM ABDULLAH MANGUSSO @ SIRAGO	Secretary
MARIO MONDLANE @ WILLIAM MANQUANE	Treasurer
VICTORINO MONDLANE	Asst. Treasurer
FREDDY BROWN @ IBRAHIM ABDULLAH @ BABUSH @ IBRAHIM ALI	Executive
FERNANDO SOARES @ FREDDY SCHWARTZ	Adviser
LEONARDO CUMBE	Executive
FRANCISCO MUNGUAMBE	Executive
JEREMIAH MAHLUZA	Executive

Operational Command

MATIAS MBOA	Head of Command
IBRAHIM MANGUSSO	
FREDDY BROWN	
LEONARDO CUMBE	
CONSTANTIN ANDREW DLAMINI	

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APPENDIX "B"

F.R.E.L.I.M.O. IN SWAZILAND

NOTES ON PERSONALITIES

IBRAHIM ABDULLAH MANGUSSO (MANGUCO) @ SIRAGO - Afro-Asian (Arab) born Lourenco Marques, 17.2.1927. Upholsterer. Joined UDENAMO in late 1950s arrested L.M. 1961 along with seven other Coloured members. Released 17.12.1962 after 14 months imprisonment. Fled to Mbabane 2.1.1963. Visited Dar-Es-Salaam December, 1963 on travel document obtained after falsely claiming that he was a Nyasa.

MATHIAS MPCA @ MATHIAS ZEFANIAS BOAS @ MATHIAS THOMAS KHUMALO. Born Lourenco Marques 1939. Clerk in Mozambique Agricultural Dept. Joined FRELIMO 1962 went to Dar-Es-Salaam in 1963 then for guerilla training in Algeria for five months. On return was appointed "Commandant of Munitions" at the FRELIMO training camp at Kongwe in Tanzania. In May, 1964, was sent to South Mozambique as Commander of Operations and the following month set up headquarters in Mbabane. At the time of his arrest in Mozambique, he was in possession of a 9mm parabellum pistol and 20 rounds of ammo.

MARIO MONDLANE @ WILLIAM MANQUANE - Shangaan born 1925 claims imprisoned in Lourenco Marques prior to arrival in Swaziland early 1963, but P.I.D.E. denied this. FRELIMO representative on Swaziland Refugee Welfare Committee, close associate of SYDNEY KITCHING, BILLY MORGAN and MACDONALD MASEKO, although suspecting that the latter was an informer of the S.A.P. Until his abduction in August, 1965, lived at KITCHING's house in Mbabane.

ISAIAS LEITAO NYAKA (NHACA) Tonga born Lourenco Marques 1908, arrived in Swaziland 1957. Employed as upholsterer by Mbabane Panel Beaters from July, 1962 until February, 1963. Former member of UDENAMO, he joined FRELIMO whilst in Mbabane in August, 1964, but had always assisted refugees in Swaziland. Last reported to be seriously ill in Manzini Hospital.

FERNANDO SOARES - Coloured tailor aged 48 years, self-employed with small shop in West Street, Mbabane. Appointed as adviser to the Mbabane FRELIMO committee by MATIAS MBOA. Reported to have been arrested in Johannesburg by S.A.P. in March, 1965. He was conveyed to Johannesburg by EDUARDO MONDLANE, Manager of Dorcas

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Distributors Ltd. in Manzini. SOARES was known to have been trying to obtain a passport illegally early in March so that he could go to Bechuanaland.

ANDREW CONSTANTIN DLAMINI @ CONSTANTINO DUCUANE @ ANDRE @ JAMINI @ KONSTANTIN. Shangaan employed at various mines in the R.S.A. from 1956 onwards, first underground where he won the Golden Hat for bravery and later as a mine detective. Discharged from Daggersfontein Mines, Springs on 9.1.64 after reported to be spreading subversion. Employed at the Bomvu Ridge Iron Ore Mine in 1964. Attended FRELIMO Committee meetings from August onwards and reported to be a member of the Operational Command. Visited Lourenco Marques on a number of occasions but left Swaziland for Bechuanaland on 2.8.65, entered Zambia on 2.9.65. Information from the Anglo-American Corporation Security Department indicates that DLAMINI had previously received training in sabotage either in China or Tanzania. Whilst at Bomvu Ridge he gave instructions in the art of forgery to one of his fellow workers who was later convicted of obtaining money by forging King Sobhuza's signature on cheques.

VICENTE MURIAMBO @ JOHN TIVANE, Shangaan minister of the African Episcopalian Mission. Born 1918. Arrested Havelock for illegal entry, March, 1965 and admitted being a Police agent for the past three years under the command of Capt. FRENTAS, Director of the C.I.D. in Lourenco Marques. Since June, 1964, had visited Southern Rhodesia, Zambia, Tanzania, Malawi, Bechuanaland, and the R.S.A. He was issued with passport No. E.T.4460 by Portuguese Consul General on 25.11.64, but this showed only one endorsement made at Chirundu on 26.11.64. This passport was to replace an original issued by Capt. FRENTAS. MURIAMBO was conveyed to the Goba border post at his own request and crossed voluntarily into P.E.A. In May, 1965, he was in Bechuanaland with a group of 19 FRELIMO refugees from Mbabane and was later permitted to go with them to Zambia.

FREDDY BROWN @ MOHAMMED ALI BABUSH - Very little is known of the background or activities of BROWN. His mother is believed to be still living in Lourenco Marques and he was a well known boxer and footballer in the R.S.A. for some years. His main responsibilities were to the Operational Command and he took little part in Committee activities.

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APPENDIX "C"

FRENTE DE LIBERTACAO DE MOZAMBIQUE (F.R.E.L.I.M.O.)

BACKGROUND TO EVENTS IN SWAZILAND

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HISTORY - POLICY

On 25th June, 1962, after a week long conference in Dar-Es-Salaam, officials of the three principal African nationalist parties of Mozambique stated that they had agreed to a merger, the new party to be known as Frente De Libertacao de Mozambique (F.R.E.L.I.M.O.). The parties involved, National Democratic Union (U.D.E.N.A.M.O.); Mozambique African National Union (M.A.N.U.); and National Union of Independent Mozambique (U.N.A.M.I.), had been subjected to continuous pressure from Julius NYERERE and Pan African Freedom Movement of East, Central and South Africa (P.A.F.M.E.C.S.A.) to form a united front.

2. Dr. Eduardo C. MONDLANE, sociologist and professor of anthropology at Syracuse University, New York, was instrumental in securing the agreement of unwilling party leaders to the merger. He had not previously been a member of any Party, but was appointed President of the new Front and remains so today, in spite of several attempts to remove him.

3. An immediate joint declaration by the parties stated that within a period of 90 days, arrangements would be made to transfer all properties owned and controlled by them to the Supreme Council of FRELIMO, and in a policy statement declared that their aim was to rally the nationalist forces of Mozambique towards independence in the shortest possible period.

4. In an interview with the Syracuse Post-Standard in July, 1962, Dr. MONDLANE is reported to have said that the only way his country could gain its freedom was by war, that there would be war within two years unless Portugal moved towards independence for Mozambique, and that nationalists would not wait until Dr. SALAZAR was overthrown. "As for starting a war" he said, "the Front could obtain military equipment very easily." During the month of August, 1962, he announced that the Party Executive in Dar-Es-Salaam had received a substantial gift of arms from an unnamed source, an offer of training facilities had been accepted and a committee had been formed to select volunteers for training as soldiers. Algeria is believed to have offered most of this assistance.

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5. The first Congress of FRELIMO took place in Dar-Es-Salaam between the 23rd and 28th September, 1962. Rashidi KAWANA, Prime Minister of Tanganyika, and Oscar KAMBONA Minister of the Interior attended the opening session and re-affirmed their sympathy and the complete solidarity of the Government and people of Tanganyika with the people of Mozambique.

6. After condemning the policy of all Colonial Governments, the Congress examined the needs of the Mozambique people in their struggle for liberation and adopted the following resolutions to be put into immediate effect by the Central Committee:

- (a) The development and consolidation of the organisational structure of the movement.
- (b) The fostering of unity between Mozambicans.
- (c) The accelerated training of cadres.
- (d) The social and cultural development of women.
- (e) The encouragement of literacy and the creation of schools.
- (f) Support for trade unions, youth, students and women's organisations.
- (g) Close co-operation with all African national movements.
- (h) To procure all the requirements for self-defence and resistance by the people.
- (i) The use of propaganda by every method to enlist world support.
- (j) To procure diplomatic, moral and material help from all peace and freedom loving countries.

7. In the opening stages of the conference, it was stressed that its importance lay in the fact that it was a 'Congress of Unity', that the Front was established at the demand of militants from the different Mozambican organisations. Yet in the short time since its conception the Front has already split and a number of founder members have been suspended or have withdrawn their support.

8. The Central Committee consisted of the following officials at the time of the Conference.

Eduardo Chiranko MONDLANE	President
Rev. Uria Timotes SIMANGO	Vice President
David Joseph Maurice MABUNDA	Secretary General.
Paulo J. GUMANE	dep. Sec. Gen.
Unknown	Treasurer

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John MAWENDA	dep. Treasurer
Leo Aldridge MILAS	Publicity Secretary
Ali MOHAMMED	dep. Pub. Sec.
John SAKUPWANA	Chief Organiser

9. Causes of dissension were varied, but were largely based on personal or tribal rivalries. A certain amount of criticism was directed at Dr. MONDLANE for his apparent involvement with, and too great a reliance upon, the Western World. This criticism was not altogether justified. While Dr. MONDLANE did have close connections with America and was pro-Western in outlook, he made it clear that he would accept aid regardless of origin.
10. Whatever the individual cause, the result was that UDENAMO was revived with the support of former MANU leaders and continues as a separate and rival organisation based in the U.A.R.
11. According to FRELIMO at the end of 1963, the co-ordinating Committee of the Organisation of African Unity (O.A.U.), recognised FRELIMO as the only liberation movement in Mozambique and approved grants of aid for it. FRELIMO was also acknowledged by nearly all the independent African states including Ghana, and the U.A.R., although the last two named were at the same time encouraging UDENAMO.
12. In 1963, considerable progress was made in opening permanent branch offices in Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia and the U.A.R., and in establishing offices and camps for refugees in Tanganyika. Dr. MONDLANE was considering moving his headquarters to Lusaka and establishing a branch office in Mbabane.
13. FRELIMO had also succeeded in recruiting Mozambicans for military training 65 in Nyasaland and 200 in East Africa. These... men underwent training in Algeria and other African states.
14. Early in 1964, it was announced that the African Liberation Committee (A.L.C.) had approved a plan to infiltrate small groups of trained saboteurs across the Tanganyika/Mozambican border to organise pockets of guerilla resistance in Northern Mozambique. M. DOS SANTOS (FRELIMO Secretary for External Relations) concluded an interview broadcast on Moscow Radio in July, 1964, with an appeal to all Mozambicans to unite around FRELIMO and organise themselves into clandestine groups ready for the time when they would receive instructions from the FRELIMO militants.
15. In May, 1964, in a despatch published by the New China News Agency (N.C.N.A.), FRELIMO urged the people to prepare for an armed struggle, adding that in the political field it was necessary

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to strengthen national unity in order to neutralise the enemy. It emphasised the need to make every Mozambican a militant.

16. JOEL MUNGUAMBE @ GUDUANE, permanent representative in Algeria in the same month told the N.C.N.A. correspondent there, that FRELIMO was then organising people in different regions, (of Mozambique) and stirring national consciousness so as to unite them in support of the armed struggle.

17. It was also in May, 1964, that Mozambique freedom fighters in Dar-Es-Salaam were reported to be talking of war on three fronts entailing concerted military action by Angolan, Mozambican and Portuguese Guinea liberation armies.

18. In September, 1964, the first attacks were launched against P.E.A. by about 80 of the newly trained freedom fighters. In spite of exaggerated claims, successes were of little more than propaganda value.

19. In November, 1964, Dr. MONDLANE, commenting upon the operation said that the plan had been finalised in 1963, and readiness achieved by July, 1964. After consultation with other African states, September 25th was decided on as the commencement date for large scale operations. Dr. MONDLANE added that the next phase would be to weaken the military power of the Portuguese and the economy of the country by acts of sabotage and de-moralisation. He claimed that FRELIMO soldiers were now being trained in Mozambique itself.

20. Dr. MONDLANE, in a more cautious mood in January, 1965, announced that in addition to the training of fighters in Mozambique, the Front was concentrating on political and organisational work amongst the people, having decided that military operations alone were ineffective, unless supported by party groups established illegally in Mozambique. He promised that a regular army would be created later, founded on the basis of partisan unit experience. He explained that although units were now in operation in five Provinces, enemy resistance in Southern Mozambique had delayed the start of operations there. FRELIMO was, therefore, concentrating on developing political activity in the Beira and Lourenco Marques regions.

21. From the inception of the Front, it is obvious that the leaders were convinced that the policy of the Portuguese Government could only be influenced by force of arms, and that a military solution was intended from the beginning. In spite of his frequent statements on his determination to overthrow the Government, Dr. MONDLANE was regarded as far too inactive by certain members

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of the Central Committee who believed him to be a willing advocate of the American policy of moderation. It was probably in an attempt to alleviate the frustration felt by his more impatient supporters and other critics, and to fulfil Dr. MONDLANE's earlier promises, that the armed attacks were launched in September, 1964.

22. Viewing this decision in retrospect, it was obviously premature as events have proved. The guerillas received little support from the local populace and the amount of active resistance from the people had been greatly overestimated. Dr. MONDLANE was left with the unavoidable conclusion that progress in organising the Front within Mozambique had in no way kept pace with the training of his guerillas, hence the re-appraisal and the decision to organise politically in Southern Mozambique.

23. In May, 1965, the structure and composition of the Central Committee was as follows:

Dr. E. C. MONDLANE	President
Rev. U. T. SIMANGO	Vice President
Marcelino DOS SANTOS	Sec. for Ext. relations & Org. Sec. for foreign aid.
Lourenco MUTACA	Financial Secretary
Jaime Rivas SIGAUKE @ James ZULU	Sec. for Internal Org.
Paul BAYEKE	Vice Sec. for Inform.
Silverio NUNQU	Admin. Sec.
J. MSADALA	Vice Sec. for finance.
Jorge REBELO	Legal Adviser.
Lasaro KAVANDAMO	Org. in N. Mozambique
P. MOCUMBI	
Baltazar CHAGONGO	

Office - 201, Nkrumah Street, P. O. Box 15274, Dar-Es-Salaam. Telephone 22521.

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APPENDIX "D"

FRENTE DE LIBERTACAO DE MOZAMBIQUE (F.R.E.L.I.M.O.)

BACKGROUND TO EVENTS IN SWAZILAND

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ORGANISATION AND ACTIVITIES IN MOZAMBIQUE

In defining the structure of the organisation in their pamphlet 'Statutes and Programme', FRELIMO directed that formations be established at National, Provincial, District, Locality and Circle levels.

2. Practically no information is locally available regarding what stage the organisation reached in Central and Northern Mozambique only that the Territory was divided into four regions as follows:

- | | |
|------------|---|
| Region I | Niassa, Cabo Dalgado Districts. |
| Region II | Mozambique and Zambezia Districts. |
| Region III | Tete and Manica Sofala Districts. |
| Region IV | Gaza, Inhambane and Lourenco Marques Districts. |

3. Each Region was to be commanded by a Regional Commander. The basic unit was the circle consisting of five members, one of whom would be the leader. Between 10 - 20 circles would make up a Localidade. Districts, also known as Sectors, presumably were intended to conform to the administrative areas, which in turn came under the Regional Headquarters.

4. In the 4th Region, also known as the 'sud du Sabe' (South of the Sabie River), organisation on the pattern laid down was only introduced in October, 1964. Prior to this, awareness of a national political movement was confined to the inhabitants of the towns who, in many cases, believed that UDENAMO was still the dominating movement, a belief that widely prevailed until 1964. This was partly due to neglect by FRELIMO and to the vigorous control which P.I.D.E. imposed. Representatives from Dar-Es-Salaam and North Mozambique rarely visited the rural areas and had made little progress in publicising the Movement.

5. In mid-1963, MATIAS MBOA, the 'Sud du Sabe' Regional Commander of Operations, arrived in Lourenco Marques by way of Bulawayo and Malvern. His mission was one of reconnaissance - exploration of frontiers - with the intention of establishing bases

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for action into Mozambique, caches for the storage of equipment and material, and to arrange facilities for the transit of freedom fighters.

6. Reports up to this date revealed that a number of small isolated groups, mainly the remnants of UDENAMO, still existed in some towns. These cell-like structures were little more than discussion groups whose main object appears to have been the recruitment of new members for training abroad. Membership was limited strictly to close friends, there was no co-operation between the cells and communication with Headquarters in Dar-Es-Salaam was practically non-existent. A negligible amount of propaganda activity was evident in some places, but designed primarily to attract recruits.

7. In Lourenco Marques itself, two large groups had existed for some time. It is only possible to speculate as to how they came into being, but members in both groups had belonged to UDENAMO and had also met Dr. Eduardo MONDLANE during his official visit to P.E.A. as United Nations Adviser in 1961.

8. Of these two, the largest was that under the leadership of Dr. A. M. AROUCA, a leading Coloured Lawyer in Lourenco Marques. Around Dr. AROUCA were gathered the more intellectual nationalists, African and Coloured, evolués and assimilados, and a number of unidentified Portuguese. It has been alleged that this group originally European, was first established 15 years ago, and that the Europeans were now out-numbered by the Coloured and African members. Dr. AROUCA was President of the Central Association of Negroes of the Province of Mozambique (CANPM), a social, cultural and educational organisation reputed to have a membership of 15,000.

9. In addition to Dr. AROUCA, the following CANPM officials were members of FRELIMO:

Luis Augusto Bernardo Manuel HOWANE	Second Secretary
Afonso Andre S. UCHUANE	First Sec. and Pres. of the Students' Ass.
Abner Sansao MUTHEMBA	} Members of Committee for recreation & sport.
Daniel Tome MAGAIA	
Rogério Daniel JANANA	Substitute Comm. member.

Other influential members of this FRELIMO group were:

Jose Gomes NERO

Jose CRAVEIRINHA, journalist, poet, writer and President of
the African Assoc.

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Malangatane Valente NGWENYA, artist.

Joao Correia DOS REIS, journalist, proprietor and founder
of 'Tribuna'.

Francisco Rui Moniz BARETTO @ 'Rui NAGAR', writer and poet.

Armando Pedro MUIANE, civil servant.

It was to this group in Lourenco Marques known as the Cidade Baixa section, that MATIAS MBOA presented himself as Supreme Regional Commander of the 'Sud du Sabe'.

10. The second group in Lourenco Marques was that of the Cidade Alta, also known as the Gaza group, entirely African, sadly disorganised, with only intermittent communications with Dar-Es-Salaam, held together by the strength and the personality of MATEUS SANSAO MUTHIEMBA, a former mission teacher, and his son, MILAGRE MUTHIEMBA. This group was based in the African Location of Alto Mae on the outskirts of Lourenco Marques.

11. There was little co-operation between these two groups in Lourenco Marques although MATEUS MUTHIEMBA's brother ABNER, served on the CANPM committee. News of MBOA's arrival was withheld from the Gaza group, as later was the fact that he had been imprisoned by P.I.D.E. for six months. Both groups, on instructions from Dr. E. MONDLANE in August, 1962, had encouraged youngsters to go to Dar-Es-Salaam for training, but the number who eventually reached their destination is not known. At least three parties totalling 30 recruits were arrested in the Border area of Malvernia (Southern Rhodesia) between January and April, 1964. Reports reveal that before this period, small groups got through safely. One of them returned early in 1964 with copies of the FRELIMO Constitution and Statutes for the Cidade Alta branch, who however, made no attempt to carry out the directive on organisation as they were informed that a Central Committee representative would arrive later. The Cidade Alta officials took this to be a reference to JOEL GUDUANE, whereas it was more probably MBOA, already then on his way to Lourenco Marques, briefed by the central Committee that a branch existed in Gaza. The parties arrested at Malvernia contained the majority of the more dedicated members of the Gaza branch who were not released from prison until the end of September, 1964, and the branch was moribund for six months of MBOA's stay in Lourenco Marques.

12. In describing the situation prior to JOEL GUDUANE's arrival, the Gaza leader, MATEUS MUTHIEMBA, reported, 'groups existed without plan of action or objectives, that emissaries sent from Headquarters failed to contact groups, and after wandering around distributing

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pamphlets/4.....

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pamphlets clandestinely, disappeared in the manner in which they arrived'. This state of chaos, whilst due in part to the absence of Gaza's leading personalities in prison, was also due to increasing watchfulness by P.I.D.E., who began to take a closer interest in the activities of the former associates of the imprisoned students. However, during this period, the Cidade Baixa group improved communications with the Swaziland Operational Command by frequent if irregular couriers to Mbabane, still unbeknown to the Gaza branch.

13. JOEL GUDUANE at one time FRELIMO representative in Algiers, arrived in Lourenco Marques at the end of October, 1964. He first made contact with the Gaza branch where he was already known to MILAGRE, and stayed with the MUTHEMBAs. Within a few days he was introduced to members of the Cidade branch, when, for reasons unknown, he decided to move to the house of one of Dr. AROUCA's friends, one ROGIERIO, believed to be ROGEIRIO JANANA of CANPM. After this MILAGRE was the only member of the Gaza branch in touch with JOEL. Before leaving the MUTHEMBAs, JOEL had briefed the students' representatives, GUEBUZA, CHICHAHA and MILAGRE MAZUZE, and the work of organising the Front in the 4th Region along the lines laid down in the 'Statutes' had begun. One of JOEL's first jobs was the production of his instructions 'Internal Regulations for Localidades and Circles' later typed and duplicated by MILAGRE. To the Gaza branch, JOEL allocated two tasks:

(a) the political organisation of the people, by establishing circles in Lourenco Marques and the rural areas, to provide indispensable support for the combatants; and

(b) the recruitment of young men for the Operational Command.

14. Thus the Gaza branch or group, still rather loosely knit, became a controlling Circle directly under the leadership of JOEL, with the object of extending the organisation throughout the 4th Region, responsibility being broken down as follows:

SIDONIA BILA	Courier and organiser for Inhambane
MILAGRE MUTHEMBA	Nominal leader and chief organiser
LUCAS BAZIMA	Organiser, Guija.
ANGELO CHICHAHA	Organiser, Chambankulu
MATEUS MUTHEMBA	Secret service organiser & Gaza chief.
MILAGRE MAZUZE	Provisional organiser for Joao Belo.
AMOS MAHANJANE	Provisional organiser
VIRGINIA TEMBE	Organiser of League Femina.

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15. SIDONIA BILA, the owner of a taxi service, was to establish FRELIMO in the Inhambane district but also acted as liaison officer for JOEL, providing contact with sympathisers throughout the Region. Linking agents were planted by JOEL on his journey to Lourenco Marques from North Mozambique, via Inharrime. Their identities were unknown to other members of the Gaza group. The younger MUTHEMBA acted in a similar capacity to JOEL in the city of Lourenco Marques.

16. MATEUS MUTHEMBA was entrusted with two missions, Command of the secret service, and organisation of the chiefs and elders in the Gaza district. His was probably the most difficult task of all. In tones of disgust he reports that after an exhaustive campaign throughout the district, he found all the chiefs except one at Gaza, to be corrupt and through them the people, who almost without exception acted as informers for the Portuguese. He described the methods used, which varied from blatant terrorism and murder, bribery, banishment, and the confiscation of farm machinery and implements, as so effective that even children denounced any stranger appearing in their locality. MATEUS was able to enlist the support of only a handful of men in Joao Belo, one in Magude, and five in Chibuto. He thereafter confined his efforts to Lourenco Marques itself, still concentrating on the older men in the age group 35 - 50 years.

17. Other members of the Gaza group met with more success, particularly among the younger men and students in Lourenco Marques. CHICHAHA, ARMANDO GUEBUZA and MILAGRE MUTHEMBA had all attended day and evening classes at three of the leading institutions in Lourenco Marques, the Liceu Salazar, Escola Commercial and the Escola Industriale. GUEBUZA was President of the Students' Association (Nuceo dos Estudantes de Negros e Provincia do Mozambique) and used the Association as cover for FRELIMO meetings.

18. The Secretary of the Students' Association, CHRISTINA TEMBE, worked with CHICHAHA's fiancée, ELIZABETH SARAIVA, in recruiting girl students for the Legaue Femina, or Women's Branch of FRELIMO. These girls were destined for training as nurses, to carry food and water to combatants, or to be employed at Headquarters in Dar-Es-Salaam. VIRGINIA TEMBE, wife of SIDONIA BILA, was also recruiting women, mostly housewives, for the League Femina.

19. The Cidade Baixa branch does not appear to have played a very prominent part in the organisation. With the approval of MATIAS MBOA, they had regarded themselves as the leaders of the movement in the City, and had nominated members for Gaza District, having decided upon a date for the commencement of terrorist

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operations/6.....

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operations in Lourenco Marques and Gaza. They had promised aid in the form of money, medicines and bicycles to the Gaza branch, and individual members sometimes assisted in the organisational work, but the ill feeling between the two groups originated from something deeper than mere professional rivalry. There is no doubt that on MATEUS MUTHEMBA's part it was racial hatred of the European and non-African.

20. Within two months of JOEL's arrival, more than 55 circles were operating with a membership in excess of 200. A few of these, such as MUTHEMBA's control circle in Chambankulu, had reached the stage where they functioned as Localidades, but the majority of those identified so far grew around the embryonic Regional Headquarters in Lourenco Marques, of which JOEL was the centre.

21. In forming his circle, known as the P.I.L.M. (Private, Internal, Lourenco Marques) and Gaza branch, ANGELO CHICHAHA appointed the following committee ;

- | | | |
|-----|-------------------|--|
| (1) | ANGELO CHICHAHA | Circle Commander 'A' section, General Secretariat. |
| (2) | ARMANDO GUEBUZA | 'B' section, 'secret service' |
| (3) | MILAGRE MAZUZE | 'C' section. 'Propaganda & Publicity' |
| (4) | Unknown | 'D' section 'Operational Command' |
| (5) | ELIZABETH SARAIVA | 'E' section - organiser, Gaza |
| (6) | LUCAS BAZIMA | 'F' section - 'finance |
| (7) | GEORGE NYAMPOSSE | 'G' section, organiser, Xinhambanine |
| (8) | JUILIO Unknown | 'H' section, organiser, Diamantino |
| (9) | ANTHONY MATHOLA | 'I' section, organiser, Mafalala. |

22. Two of these, Nos. 3 and 6, were already members of MILAGRE MUTHEMBA's circle. Although the first five named members had primary roles as specialists, it was also intended that they should recruit members for their own circles, which in turn would become a Localidade once ten or more circles had been formed.

23. What happened, in fact, was that recruitment, left almost entirely in the hands of MILAGRE CHICHAHA and GUEBUZA, was concentrated on the readily accessible Chambankulu Location and the three schools which, although providing a rapid increase in membership, did not extend the organisation beyond these confines. This is illustrated by the fact that in one class of students being taught by a member of the American Consulate in Lourenco Marques were members of three circles, one belonging to the Cidade Baixa and the other two from Cidade Alta circles. Not one of these was aware of the

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identity of the other members. This was the exception to the general rule and suggests that expansion by the creation of new cells had reached its limits among the students of that school at least.

24. It has been possible to identify only the following Localidades:

- (1) Cidade Baixa (Chambankulu Location)
- (2) Cidade Alta
- (3) P.I.L.M., Gaza
- (4) League Femina
- (5) Joao Belo
- (6) Inhambane
- (7) Bela Vista.

25. In addition to the circles formed within Lourenco Marques, leaders had been nominated in other towns listed below. No information is available regarding their activities, but it is considered unlikely that they attained the stage reached by the PIILM Gaza branch where the circumstances were so favourable.

<u>Towns</u>		<u>District</u>
Maxixe, Massinga		Inhambane
Inharrime		
Manjacaze, Chicumbane	}	
Chibuto, Chongoene		Gaza
Chidenguele, Magude		
Bela Vista		Lourenco Marques
Manhica		

26. On the 11th December, 1964, JOEL GUDUANE sent LEONARDO FRANCISCO CUMBE to the Operations Committee in Swaziland ordering MATIAS MBOA to report to him on 18th December for discussions. CUMBE first came to Swaziland in April, 1964, in the guise of a refugee, to assist MATIAS in establishing the Operation Committee and to act as liaison between Lourenco Marques and Mbabane.

27. The subject of the proposed discussions has not been confirmed but MATEUS MUTHEMBA relates that their work had advanced to the stage where JOEL was proposing to go to Dar-Es-Salaam to arrange for the provision of arms, and that MATIAS was needed to discuss the feasibility of commanding operations from Swaziland. It is considered that this is what was intended, rather than that MATIAS should assume overall command of the 4th Region. Up to this date there is nothing to suggest that military training was given to any

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of the circles/8.....

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of the circles in Lourenco Marques and reports of activities other than recruiting or propaganda (except in FIDE press allegations) have not come to light.

28. In the P.I.L.M. group, members of the propaganda and publicity sections were reproducing leaflets at their places of employment even using material and facilities unwittingly provided by a printing works. The leaflets were mainly copies of items brought from Dar-Es-Salaam.

29. The Operational Command of this group had made a very detailed survey of Government security force strength and dispositions, and communication in Lourenco Marques and the Gaza district, as the basis of their plan of military operations. They had progressed no further.

30. MATIAS MBOA in Mbabane received the instruction from JOEL GUDUANE shortly after the 11th December and made arrangements for a Coloured man, FLORIANO DA SILVA, to meet him at Nomahasha on the Swaziland/P.E.A. border on 16th December, to convey him to Lourenco Marques. FLORIANO, who earned a living smuggling people and commodities into the Republic of South Africa, was the owner of a large new Fiat motor car, and a licensed 7.65 Walther automatic and was permitted to make numerous uninterrupted journeys through the border posts of P.E.A. and the Republic, none of which accorded with his apparent station in life. FLORIANO, who had assisted the Cidade Baixa group on occasions, failed to arrive at the rendezvous. He later said that he had by then refused to help FRELIMO because he felt it was becoming too racial in its outlook.

31. Meanwhile in Lourenco Marques, PIDE had discovered that JOEL was in the 'Sud du Save' from a member of the Operational Command captured earlier at Inharrime together with JOEL's father. PIDE mounted an intensive operation and publicly offered a reward of one hundred contos, later increased to 200 contos (200,000\$) for JOEL's capture.

32. The order for MATIAS to report to Lourenco Marques was therefore countermanded, and LUIS BERNARDO HOWANE was sent to Mbabane but, finding MATIAS had already left, he returned to Nomahasha, meeting MATIAS there on the evening of the 16th December. MATIAS refused to accept the countermanding of this order and together with the two couriers arrived in Lourenco Marques on the evening of 18th December, 1964.

33. In view of the increased PIDE activity, MATIAS was instructed to stay with MATEUS MUTHEMBA, who, as head of the secret service,

was responsible/9.....

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was responsible for his safety, and warned not to go out during the day. Instead of doing this, he went to his own house and that night sent for FLORIANO. MATIAS MBOA and FLORIANO were out all night together, returning next morning with the excuse that they had reconnoitred PIDE headquarters, Police headquarters, the civil prison at Machava and military establishments. MATIAS spent the whole of Saturday (19th December) in discussion with JOEL. He had persuaded a member of the Baixa group to take him to JOEL's house contrary to the instruction which prescribed a 'safe' house for their meeting. That night FLORIANO and JOSE CRAVEIRINHA were with MATIAS, where after further discussion he arranged for FLORIANO to take him to Machava on the following day. He said he had business there and had earlier asked JOEL for money for the journey. Instead of going to Machava, he went to his father's house at Marracuene, where FLORIANO left him. During the course of the afternoon, a young boy, son of a neighbour, is reported to have entered the house, on instructions from the local chief, to find out who the visitor was. MATIAS allegedly persuaded the youngster not to report his presence and remained there until he was arrested in bed at 0200 hrs. on 21st December, by messengers of the Chief who handed him over to PIDE. Within 12 hours of his arrival in Lourenco Marques, MATIAS had led PIDE to JOEL's house.

34. Leaders of the Cidade Baixa section discussed MBOA's arrest later that morning, but nothing was done until 1700 hrs., when ROGEIRO eventually went to warn JOEL and was caught by PIDE as they left the house with JOEL in handcuffs. After questioning ROGEIRO they ordered him to report to PIDE headquarters on the following day. LUIS BERNARDO was arrested on the 23rd December, and six armed members of the Operational Command were also arrested in other parts of the 4th Region. ROGEIRO was also arrested when he reported to PIDE on 23rd December. Upon searching ROGEIRO's house they discovered a large sum of money and FRELIMO documents given to him for safe keeping by JOEL, but a firearm, ammunition, code books and other documents were later retrieved from a hiding place in the North of the 4th Region, probably Joao Belo, by SIDONIA BILA. It is not known what became of these.

35. News of JOEL's arrest prompted the members of the PIILM branch into what they termed 'an act of revenge to signal the commencement of a campaign of psychological warfare'. This entailed the widespread distribution of FRELIMO propaganda and the painting of slogans throughout Lourenco Marques and Gaza district on Christmas Eve. PIDE later claimed that FRELIMO planned to explode a bomb

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during the midnight service in the Lourenco Marques cathedral on Christmas Eve.

36. The propaganda exercise was quite successful, although the effects were later exaggerated by the elder MUTHEMBA who reported 'the explosion of the pamphlet bomb convinced the Portuguese of the existence of a strong organisation opposed to colonialism, shaking them to their foundations, and leaving them in a state of terror'. This, incidentally, is the only reference to a bomb. There is little doubt that FRELIMO's intention was to use explosives and firearms in their campaign, but there is no evidence to support PIDE's allegation that a bomb was to be exploded in the Cathedral on Christmas Eve, or that the FRELIMO groups in Lourenco Marques had explosives in their possession.

37. The Portuguese appear to have soon recovered from their terror, and immediately arrested ARMANDO GUEBUZA and some of the others responsible for the activities on the 24th. Almost the entire group around the MUTHEMBAs then decided to make their way to Dar-Es-Salaam via Swaziland. This group form the bulk of 50 odd refugees who arrived in Swaziland in January and February, 1965.

38. In the Cidade Baixa, no precautions were taken and only JOSE CRAVEIRINHA and MALANGATANE NGWENYA, accompanied by two other less important members, fled to Mbabane with the assistance of FLORIANO DA SILVA on 23rd December. The remainder apparently felt no great apprehension. All the leaders of this group, listed in para 9 above were arrested between 5th and 7th January, after which PIDE proceeded to carry out a more leisurely mopping up of ancilliary circle leaders.

39. It is not known if PIDE's success was due to penetration built up over the years, or to the effectiveness of their interrogation methods. Their task was perhaps rendered somewhat easier by the fact that the most active leaders had come to their notice in the past, indeed many of them had been imprisoned on previous occasions for political activity. It is widely known that PIDE exert considerable pressure on prisoners and offer many inducements with the object of turning them into informers after release.

40. Among the conclusions to be drawn from information available is that, owing to the tight Government control, FRELIMO gained very little support in the rural areas and made the greatest progress among the large communities residing in the Locations in Lourenco Marques.

41. At the same time it is as well to remember that their

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achievements in such a short period were quite remarkable, and indicative of the discontent felt by young Africans in P.E.A. today. This is perhaps best summed up in MATEUS MUTHEMBA's statement:

"JOEL limited his action to the Black Africans, the oppressed, needy people, young men who had already suffered imprisonment in the cause of the Mozambican Liberation Movement; in short, people who have overriding reasons to go against the colonialists and these people were in the majority in the Cidade Alta, where I and MILAGRE were living, and therefore with facilities of meeting them".

42. This quotation is taken somewhat out of context, as it forms part of a letter from MATEUS to the Central Committee in which he explains the causes of the dissension between the Cidade Alta and Baixa sections and lays the blame for JOEL's capture on the 'intellectual' members of the predominantly Coloured Baixa section.

43. There is no evidence even suggesting the existence of a larger or better organised group than that of the MUTHEMBAs and its ancilliary the PIRM Gaza branch. Of the 140 members interviewed in Swaziland since January, 1965, there were few who could not be linked with one or more of the circles already identified.

44. The capture of six of JOEL's colleagues in other parts of the 4th Region, each of whom had received military training in Tanganyika or abroad, suggests that similar plans were being put into effect elsewhere. The fact that so few fugitives connected with these six men have come to notice in Swaziland supports the theory that they were concerned with specialist tasks, probably of a military nature, and were not engaged in large scale recruitment.

45. PIDE's success, and the comparative ease with which they captured practically the entire upper echelons of FRELIMO in the 'Sud du Save' are not entirely due to their stroke of luck in capturing MATIAS MBOA. FLORIANO's part in the affair remains undisclosed, but all the indications are that he was working for PIDE. There is no doubt in the minds of MATEUS MUTHEMBA and his followers that MATIAS was betrayed by FLORIANO. MATEUS, however, bases his suspicions primarily on the racial aspect, and Cidade Baixa's failure to warn JOEL. Very little would have been achieved by prematurely arresting the two groups. It was possibly for this reason that PIDE took no action against them although they may have known of their activities for some time, and certainly since September, when ALBINO MAHECHE, a close friend of JOSE CRAVEIRINHA, was arrested at Nomahasha.

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
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46. JOEL can have been left in little doubt that the 4th Region was completely unsuitable for guerilla-type operations owing to lack of local support from FRELIMO and to the domination of the 4th Region by the Portuguese authorities. At the same time, although there were certain advantages to be found in the City of Lourenco Marques, and the larger towns which provided a refuge, any armed revolt would have to come from outside. It was probably for this reason that MATIAS was called to Lourenco Marques.

47. Support for FRELIMO is still available within Lourenco Marques, but whether this is utilised will depend upon the arrival of new leaders from Tanganyika. There are none left at large in Lourenco Marques.

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BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION,

ZOMBA,

MALAWI

Ref: POL C/37

9 March 1966

TK 136/4-165

*Dear Department**NTC*

- (1) Please refer to Fairlie's letter C.1219/1/28 of 20 January 1966 forwarded to us under a compliments slip.

With all due respect to Drynan's memory we should perhaps point out that until just before Independence there was only an Honorary Portuguese Consul (de Souza) in Malawi. It seems to us inherently unlikely that he would have a career diplomat working for him as "Assistant Consul".

Drynan's recollection of da Costa as a fairly regular commuter to (or from?) Northern Rhodesia and da Costa's own claim to Zambian connections (Campbell's letter GEN 111/508/01 of 21 December 1965) suggests that the answer might lie in a confusion in da Costa's mind between Malawi and Zambia.

Yours sincerely,

(R. Bloom)

Protocol Department,
Foreign Office,
Whitehall, S.W.1.

CONFIDENTIAL

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K.O.H. Osborne, Esq.

Colonial Office

JSA 1822/2




W. H. H. -

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H.342

With the compliments of

THE WEST AND CENTRAL AFRICAN
DEPARTMENT



FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

8 March, 1966

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CON 10/9

British Consulate-General,

LOURENÇO MARQUES.

15 February, 1966

JSA 1822/2

JSA 1822/2
EU 100/46
100

Would you refer to my letter CON.10/9 of 8 December about the kidnapping of refugees from Mozambique in Swaziland.

2. I spent the last weekend in Mbabane and discussed this matter with the Commissioner and Fairlie, the External Affairs Secretary. I was told, as perhaps you have already heard, that they had now spoken to the Portuguese Consul in Mbabane on the line suggested in paragraph 5(a) of your letter of 8 November. The Consul apparently took the point and told Fairlie that PIDE in Mozambique had received instructions from Lisbon to watch their step and not to give any ground for allegations that they were acting illegally in Swaziland. In view of the publicity which these cases have attracted, I think this is not unlikely.

3. I was also told that the flow of refugees from Mozambique into Swaziland had now dropped to a very small trickle and that most of those coming through were individuals of low calibre and education who were probably adopting the guise of political refugees with the purpose of obtaining employment in Swaziland.

I am copying this to Burroughs in Lisbon and Wilson in Cape Town.

(H.J. Downing)
H.M. Consul-General

H.A.H. Cortazzi Esq.,
West and Central Africa Department,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1

RECEIVED
16 FEB 1966

CONFIDENTIAL

Telegrams
Swazi



THE SECRETARIAT,
P.O. BOX 57,
MBABANE,
SWAZILAND.

CONFIDENTIAL.

14th February, 1966.

Dear Ham,

(2) Please refer to your letter BBS.72/113/01 of 19th January about P.I.D.E. activity in Swaziland.

2. The Portuguese Consul called on me on 10th February about some other matter and I took the opportunity of raising the question of the alleged kidnapping. I said that although there was no proof that the Portuguese authorities were responsible, there were indications that this was so. The Swaziland Government did not wish to take any action which would prejudice good relations between Mozambique and Swaziland but unless there was evidence to show that these activities had been discontinued, the Swaziland Government would feel bound to consider what steps should be taken to deal with these irregularities.

3. Dr. da Costa said that the Portuguese authorities had expressly denied having anything to do with the disappearance of Eric Sengama. In the case of Langendo and Brown, however, Dr. da Costa declared, off the record, that P.I.D.E. were responsible. He said he had received assurances from Lisbon that such action would not be taken again but, he added, again off the record, that organisations like P.I.D.E. tended to be their own masters.

4. Our view is that the matter is now closed and that we shall have no more trouble. The interview incidentally gives one of two good examples of the extra-ordinary indiscretions habitually uttered by Dr. da Costa.

5. I am sending copies of this letter to the Consul in Cape Town and to Cortazzi in the Foreign Office.

Yours sincerely,
M.J. Farlie.

M. J. Farlie

M. P. Hall, Esq., C.M.G., M.B.E.

CONFIDENTIAL.



20th January, 1966.

(100) info file
Please refer to Archie Campbell's letter GEN.111/508/01 of 21st December, 1965 about the Portuguese Consul.

There is no doubt that Lopes da Costa held some consular post in Malawi. Tony Drynan, who is now O.C. Police, Lilongwe, knew him there in 1962/63 as an "assistant consul" in the Portuguese consulate. He was evidently in the habit of commuting fairly frequently to Northern Rhodesia (as it then was) but Drynan does not know for what purpose.

We had already asked the S.I.O. to find out about da Costa but he was unable to tell us anything.

The kindest thing to think is that after all he must be genuine! But we shall nevertheless keep our eyes and ears open.

M. J. FAIRLIE.

M. P. Hall, Esq., C.M.G., M.B.E.



CONFIDENTIAL

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(JSA 1822/46(65))

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

19 January, 1966.

Dear Ken,

4-342

Action has been

taken on this

12/11/66

(E.O. 111)
(F. 111)
With reference to the recent correspondence about PIDE activities in Swaziland you will now have seen Downing's letter CON 10/9 of 8 December and Burrough's 1822/65 of 31 December about an approach to the Portuguese Consul in Mbabane.

(10/11/66)
(10/11/66)
(10/11/66)
2. In view of their recommendations and the recent information about further PIDE activities contained in Long's two letters S. 1130C/24 and -/26 of 9 and 22 December respectively we now think there would be advantage in pursuing the course of action proposed in paragraph 3(a) of your letter BBS 72/113/01 of 21 October. We do not think that deportation will serve any useful purpose at the moment, but we should certainly make the Portuguese aware that we know of these PIDE activities. Incidentally, I note from the record of the Fourth Committee's meeting of 1 December that Dr. Eduardo Mondlane, as a petitioner, said he was considering "placing further evidence before the British Government and asking them to carry out further investigations" in the case of the 75 FRELIMO refugees who were picked up en route from Swaziland to Bechuanaland. It is surprising that he has not yet said anything about the disappearance of Mario Mondlane (Long's letter S. 1130/ of 9 September).

(10/11/66)
(10/11/66)
3. I am sending copies of this letter to Burroughs in Lisbon, Downing in Lourenço Marques and Wilson in Cape Town.

Yours ever
Hugh Davies

(H.Ll. Davies)

K.O. Osborne, Esq.,
Colonial Office.



CONFIDENTIAL

BBS 72/113/01
S.113CC/24

19th January, 1966.

Would you please refer to your letter of the 9th December 1965 and the associated correspondence about the case of Mario Mondlane and about F.I.D.A. activity in Swaziland generally.

2. With Campbell's letter of the 19th November, he sent you copies of our letter to the Foreign Office of the 21st October and of their consequential letter to Lisbon of the 8th November. I now enclose copies of three further letters:-

- (a) from Burroughs in Lisbon to Cortazzi of the Foreign Office, dated 11th November;
- (b) from Downing in Lourenco Marques to Cortazzi, dated 8th December; and
- (c) from Burroughs to Cortazzi of the 31st December.

3. You will see from these that it is not considered appropriate in present circumstances for this matter to be pursued in Lisbon and that in the opinion of our people in both Lourenco Marques and Lisbon it would now be preferable for an approach to be made to the Portuguese Consul in Mbabane on the lines suggested in paragraph 3(a) of the Foreign Office letter of the 8th November, as being the most likely to achieve some result. The Foreign Office share this view.

4. We would therefore be grateful if you would consider doing this. We are, it would seem, now sufficiently far away in time from the four kidnapping cases which occurred last year to make it difficult for them to be used as live issues on which to base your approach to the Consul. It may be, however, that you could take the matter up as one which has caused concern over a period of time, and bring in the four cases as particular instances. We should be grateful if you would let us know what action you take and with what result so that we can report further to Ministers here.

5. I am sending copies of this letter to Davies in the Foreign Office and also to the Embassy in Cape Town. I am also sending Cape Town copies of Campbell's earlier letter of the 19th November and its enclosures.

(H.P. Hall)

A.C.E. LONG, ESQ., C.B.E.

File No. BBS 72/123/01

Mr. Osborne 18/1

Mr. Null 19/14/5

Mr.

Mr.

Sir.

Permt. U.S. of S.

Parly. U.S. of S.

Minister of State

Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

Your Reference S 1130c/24

Date

DRAFT letter.

A.C.E. Long, Esq., C.B.E.,
Secretariat,
Mbabane,
Swaziland.

Would you please refer to your letter of the 9th December 1965 and the associated correspondence about the case of Mario Mondlane and about P.I.D.E. activity in Swaziland generally.

2. With my letter of the 19th November, I sent you copies of our letter to the Foreign Office of the 21st October and of their consequential letter to Lisbon of the 8th November. I now enclose copies of three further letters:-

(a) from Burroughs in Lisbon to Cortazzi of the Foreign Office, dated 11th November;

(b) from Downing in Lourenco Marques to Cortazzi, dated 8th December; and

(c) from Burroughs to Cortazzi of the 31st December.

3. You will see from these that it is not considered appropriate in present circumstances for this matter to be pursued in Lisbon and that in the opinion of our people in both Lourenco Marques and Lisbon it would be preferable for an approach ~~now~~ to be made to the Portuguese Consul in Mbabane on the lines

FURTHER ACTION

Copy without encls.:
H.L. Davies, Esq.,
West and Central
Africa Dept.,
Foreign Office.

Copy with encls. and
with copies of (100)
and encls. to:
British Embassy,
Cape Town.

(96)

suggested in paragraph 5(a) of the Foreign Office letter of the 8th November, as being the most likely to achieve some result. The Foreign Office share this view.

4. We ~~should~~ therefore be grateful if you would ~~now~~ consider doing this. We are, it would seem, now sufficiently far ^{away} in time from the four kidnapping cases which occurred last year to make it difficult for them to be used as live issues on which to base your approach to the Consul. It may be, however, that you could take the matter up as one which has caused concern over a period of time, and bring in the four cases as particular instances. We should be grateful if you would let us know what action you take and with what results. *that we can report further to Ministers here.*

5. I am sending copies of this letter to Davies in the Foreign Office and also to the Embassy in Cape Town. I am also sending Cape Town copies of Campbell's earlier letter of the 19th November and its enclosures.

H. P. *Hand*

Mr. Howard 11/1
 Mr. Osborne in fine subt
 Mr.
 Mr.
 Sir.

Permt. U.S. of S.
 Parly. U.S. of S.
 Minister of State
 Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

Your Reference..... Date.....

DRAFT So. letter

A.C.E. Long, Esq., C.B.E.,
 The Secretariat,
 Mbabane,
 Swaziland

(108)

C/102 and E1 + E(1)

(100)

FURTHER ACTION

Copy (without encl.)
 to:
 H. L. Davies, Esq.
 F.O.

.....
 Would you please
 refer to your letter
 (S.1130C/24) of the 9th
 December 1965 and the
 earlier correspondence
 about ^{the case of} Mario Mondlane.
 and P.D.F. activity - Swaziland generally.
 2. With my letter of the
 19th November last I sent
 you copies of ^{our letter} ~~correspondence~~
^{to} ~~with~~ the Foreign Office (and
^{of} ~~their~~ ^{consequent} letter to Lisbon. I
 now enclose copies of the
 following letters :-

(a) Burroughs (Lisbon) to
 Cortazzi (F.O.) of 11th November;

(102)

(8)

It is not considered appropriate in present circumstances for this to matter to be pursued in Lisbon, and that in the opinion of our people in well known leagues and Lisbon it would be preferable for

(b) Downing (L.M.) to Cortazzi of 8th December; and

(c) Burroughs to Cortazzi of 31st December.

E(i)

(E1)

From these you will see that an approach ^{to be made} to the Portuguese Consul at Ambahane ~~is suggested~~, along the lines of sub-paragraph 5(a) of the Foreign Office letter of 8th November, as being the most likely to achieve the desired effect. The Foreign Office share ^{this view}

(96)

3. If you have no objection we should be grateful if the appropriate informal approach could be made + if, we could be informed when this has been done + with what result. I am copying this letter to Davies at the Foreign Office.

(K.O.H. Osborne)

H342 R+R pe

A.C. Howard ^{10/11} *eng.*



With the compliments of
**THE WEST AND CENTRAL AFRICAN
DEPARTMENT**



FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.


15/1/ 1966

H. L. Davis



CONFIDENTIAL

(1822/65)



BRITISH EMBASSY,
LISBON.

31 December, 1965.

Dear Cortazzi

JSA 1822/46 (65) PW

(102)
1403/65 Jan

Would you please refer to my letter 1822/65 of 11 November about the kidnapping of Mozambique refugees in Swaziland in which I suggested that we should review at a later date the question of whether the matter should be taken up with the Portuguese authorities in Lisbon, or in Swaziland with the Portuguese Consul.

(96)
13/65 File

2. In the circumstances which now obtain, when the Portuguese Government is being brought further along the road of co-operation over supplies for Zambia etc. than many of us would have thought possible, I see no advantage in belabouring them here. I would suggest, therefore, and the Ambassador endorses this view, that the matter should be taken up in Mbabane and that it would be preferable to adopt the first of the two alternatives in paragraph 5 of your unreferenced letter of 8 November.

3. I am sending copies of this letter to Downing in Lourenço Marques and Wilson in Pretoria.

Yours ever

R.A. Burroughs

(R.A. Burroughs)

H.A.H. Cortazzi, Esq.,
West and Central African Department,
Foreign Office,
London, S.W.1.

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CON.10/9



British Consulate-General,

LOURENÇO MARQUES. EC(1)

8 December, 1965

✓
JSA 1822/46(E)

JS A 1822/46(65) PW

1963/65 File
(96) *Dear Cortazzi,*
Would you refer to your letter of 8 November to Burroughs about the kidnapping of Mozambique refugees in Swaziland.

2. In my view, there is much to be said for the action proposed in paragraph 5(a) of your letter, namely, an approach by the Swaziland authorities to the Portuguese Consul at Mbabane. This was the course which Morgan recommended when he discussed this matter with Stewart from Pretoria earlier this year. It would have the advantage of putting P.I.D.E. on notice that the Swaziland authorities were aware of their activities and prepared to take steps to counter them, and it might well be sufficient to make P.I.D.E. more circumspect in its behaviour.

3. I do not think anything would be added by representations in Lourenço Marques at this stage, although there might be something to be said for an approach here in support of action in Lisbon should the representations of the Swaziland Government prove ineffectual.

4. Deportation of P.I.D.E. agents and the banning of P.I.D.E. officials would obviously be a last resort if all other efforts to curb these activities failed. It would not make us very popular with the authorities here and we should certainly feel the draught to some extent. On the other hand I do not see that the Portuguese could retaliate seriously against Swaziland - they would certainly do nothing to interfere with the transit trade which is now a very important factor in the economy of Lourenço Marques. The Portuguese must know that they have no legal leg to stand on with regard to P.I.D.E.'s activities in Swaziland and if, therefore, their bluff were called, I would expect them to accept the situation.

I am copying this letter to Burroughs in Lisbon.

*Yours ever
Harry Downing*

(H.J. Downing)
H.M. Consul-General

H.A.H. Cortazzi Esq.,
Foreign Office,
S.W.1

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Mozambique political refugees in Swaziland: questions concerning their whereabouts. January 1-December 31, 1966. MS Refugee Records from the Offices of the United Kingdom, 1947-1970 CO 1048/918. The National Archives (Kew, United Kingdom). Refugees, Relief, and Resettlement, link.gale.com/apps/doc/IPUJIK944671547/RRRW?u=omni&sid=bookmark-RRRW&pg=24. Accessed 2 Jan. 2025.